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The moviegoer’s brain, hoodwinked by this succession of still lives, obligingly infers motion. 
− Nicholson Baker, “The Projector”1 
In “Film, Reality, and Illusion,”2 one of his many concentrated yet lucid writings on film, 
Gregory Currie argues, among other things, that when we watch a film we have the 
impression that we are seeing a ‘moving picture’ not because of an illusion perpetrated 
against our visual faculty, but because the images that we see up on the screen really are 
moving. This thesis is only one of several he puts forward in the course of the essay. It is 
an attack on ‘weak illusionism’ as the last bastion of anti-realism in philosophical film 
theory.3 I agree with his other theses: that film is a perceptually realistic medium 
(compared with other media); that a long-shot/deep-focus style is more perceptually 
realistic than other styles; and that these theses are logically and causally independent of 
theses about transparency in film (in Walton’s sense4), and illusionism (strong or weak).5 
But I believe that insisting on realism about the motion of images in a film is 
mistaken. One of the first things one learns about film is that its initially most striking 
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feature – the apparent motion of its images – is an illusion. When new viewers (usually 
children) ask us how the pictures move, we explain the illusion (most easily with a ‘flip-
book’ that gives the same sort of illusion, and with reference to the parallel way film 
projectors work. The latter will play a central role in my arguments.) 
Moreover, as Currie rightly points out, our stance on weak illusionism need not 
affect our stances on the other types of realism claimed for film. On the other hand, we 
can use weak illusionism to explain why many theorists have wrongly asserted stronger 
illusionism claims.6 For, as Currie well knows, not everyone keeps these senses of 
‘realism’ separated. If one fudges the differences between kinds of realism, and then has 
an excellent argument for weak illusionism, it will seem one has an excellent argument 
against realism tout court. 
Currie – along with the editors of Post-Theory, in which his essay appears – is 
concerned to establish a rigorously argued theory of film. This is in response to the rather 
unrigorous semiotic and psychoanalytic theory which dominated film studies up until the 
1990s. Currie’s contribution is putatively to show that film is a lot more realistic than 
those other theories have admitted, and that this observation undercuts a lot of that 
theory. To his credit, he tries to push this anti-illusionism as far as it will go. But he goes 
too far in claiming that weak illusionism is false – that is, that cinematic images really do 
move. However, because his many other claims about realism in film do hold up, and 
because he has also convincingly shown that one’s stance on weak illusionism need not 
affect one’s stance on other realism claims about film, the fact that he is wrong about 
weak illusionism leaves his impressive achievement all but untouched. 
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 I 
To begin, let me briefly explain the notion of ‘weak illusionism’. This is simply the 
position that the motion we see when we watch a film is an illusion. The images we 
watch on screen are not really moving, on this view. That is an illusion perpetrated 
against our visual faculty by the twenty-four-frames-per-second projection apparatus. 
This is called weak illusionism in contrast to ‘strong illusionism’, beloved of semiotic 
and psychoanalytic film theorists, which is the position that when we watch films we are 
under some grander illusion, such as that we are dreaming, or that we are really seeing 
the action unfold before us, not just representations of that action in a fictional world.7 
What are Currie’s arguments for his claim that weak illusionism is false – that 
film images really move? He explicitly discusses only one, and rejects it fairly swiftly. 
He points out that one could adopt a ‘kinder, gentler realism’8 à la Dennett, wherein the 
usefulness of moving-picture talk vindicates its claims to truly describe the world. Currie 
rejects this line of argument, wanting to maintain a more traditional distinction between 
usefulness and truth. But he does not consider any further positive arguments for the 
motion of film images. Rather, he says that the burden of proof in any case of purported 
illusion rests on the shoulders of the party claiming illusion. So, for instance, a 
Berkeleyan is always obliged to cast the first stone against a Moorean. Then he goes on 
to consider a battery of arguments for weak illusionism, knocking them down one by one. 
The conclusion that he draws, albeit defeasible, is that weak illusionism is false: film 
images really do move. 
I believe this strategy is mistaken, and possibly a little disingenuous, for a number 
of reasons which I will consider in turn. In the next three sections, I will attempt to show 
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that Currie cannot dismiss all the arguments he considers for weak illusionism. 
Moreover, there is more to be drawn from those he can refute. I believe, further, that 
there are implicit positive arguments in what Currie says about perceptual illusions. In the 
final sections, I will try to make these arguments explicit, and show how they do not 
work. 
Before we consider these substantive arguments, though, I would like to observe 
that there seems to be some equivocation about what the illusion in this case is, and thus 
how the burden of proof should be distributed. We may all agree that what is being 
claimed by the weak illusionist is that film perpetrates a continuous perceptual illusion 
upon the viewer. But as regards the burden of proof in illusion cases, the relevant type of 
illusion seems to be cognitive – one essentially involving a false belief. The reason we 
should ask a Berkeleyan idealist for arguments for her position is that we 
commonsensically believe in an exterior world made up of material objects. We should 
only be expected to come up with a defense of those beliefs under pressure of a 
Berkeleyan attack. Now in the cinematic case, I believe we commonsensically think there 
is a perceptual illusion. Even novice film viewers want to know how the picture manages 
to seem to move, and are then satisfied with the explanation of a rapid succession of still 
frames.9 So, according to Currie, this commonsensical belief that film is perceptually 
illusory is false, since the images in film really do move. Thus we are almost all under 
some sort of cognitive illusion. So, I would argue that more of the burden of proof falls 
on the anti-illusionist’s shoulders than Currie believes. Since almost everyone is quite 
happy to acknowledge and explain the perceptual illusion that is a motion picture, it is up 
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to anyone who denies this commonsensical view to prove that there is no perceptual 
illusion here – that, rather, we are all suffering from a cognitive illusion. 
II 
The first argument for weak illusionism Currie considers is that when we look at a strip 
of celluloid, we see images, but no movement. Currie dismisses this argument swiftly 
with an analogy to sound recordings. You can listen to a CD in at least two ways. The 
more usual is to put it into a CD-player and press ‘play’. But one can of course literally 
listen to the disc itself. To do this you would take it out of its case and hold it close to 
your ear. By this method, all CDs sound the same. They are silent. But this does not lead 
us to conclude that when we listen to a CD in the conventional sense we are subject to an 
auditory illusion. 
 I think this refutation is successful, but I would nonetheless like to look a little 
more closely at the analogy to draw out some further insights. Most importantly, there is 
more than one way in which something (CD or film) can be illusory. Listening to a CD, 
no one would have reason to deny that they were hearing sounds (unless, say, they were 
taking part in a study about drug-induced auditory hallucinations). But we can at least 
imagine the case where a novice to sound-reproduction technology (say a medieval 
peasant, transported through time) comes under the illusion that there is a band of 
munchkin musicians concealed somewhere in the stereo housing.10 
At this point it becomes more difficult to continue to draw the analogy. Certainly 
the conventional way to see a film is to sit in a dark theatre while it is projected, rather 
than to inspect the reels in a well-lit room. But once one is watching the film this way, the 
most one can say on analogy with the CD case is that one really does see something 
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(usually images) on the screen. One common way to continue the analogy is to claim that 
our medieval peasant would think there really were people up ‘on stage’ or ‘behind the 
window’ of the screen. But it seems clear now that no one would ever be subject to that 
illusion.11 
Of course, the putative illusion we are interested in is the apparent motion of the 
images. But just as the illusion that there is a little band in your stereo can be quickly 
dispelled by taking it apart, appealing to the non-existence of munchkins, and so on, you 
can be disabused of the illusion of images in motion by a slowing down of the projector. 
As one begins to see the frames being replaced by one another, and the apparent motion 
disappearing and reappearing with changes in the speed of projection, one sees that (or 
rather how, since I believe almost no one really believes the images are really moving) 
the motion is illusory.12 It is this very slow projection of a sequence of frames that I 
believe the look-at-the-film-strip argument is reaching towards. Currie dismisses it too 
quickly, and thus misses the real insights of its most charitable interpretation. 
III 
 The next argument Currie considers is one which points out that the only reason we see 
motion in films is that we have a particular kind of perceptual apparatus. Creatures which 
had different perceptual apparatuses would not necessarily perceive films as motion 
pictures. Martians with much quicker ‘refresh-rates’ to their visual systems would 
perceive films as quick slide shows of very similar slides. Bats would not perceive 
anything relevant at all. So the motion we perceive is not real. 
As it stands this is clearly a terrible argument. That not every creature has a 
faculty for perceiving a certain type of property does not mean that that kind of property 
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does not exist, or is less real than others. If that were true, the existence of bats would 
militate against the reality not just of cinematic motion but the visual in general. On the 
contrary, if creatures have evolved that can reliably discriminate between things using a 
certain faculty, one would suppose that that faculty perceives some aspect of reality.13 Of 
course, perceptual faculties can also be fooled, and in those cases we have illusions or 
misperceptions. Unfortunately for Currie, this leaves us right where we started. We need 
to figure out whether our perception of motion at the movies is like our perception of a 
blue rectangle that is an Yves Klein canvas under normal conditions, or like our 
perception of a blue rectangle that is a blank canvas poorly lit. We need to know whether 
cinematic motion is real or illusory. 
Currie might claim that he is not exactly where he started, for what he hopes to 
have convinced us of with his talk of perceptual faculties and reality is that the motion in 
film is a real response-dependent property of the film. Thus our experience of it is like 
our experience of the blue Klein canvas – and is similarly dependent on standard 
conditions of appreciation (such as a darkened room, a normal projection speed, and so 
on). 
I believe Currie equivocates a little here. Sometimes his claim about cinematic 
motion is that it is the garden-variety motion possessed by such things as my bicycle as I 
ride to school; sometimes his claim is that cinematic motion is something else – either a 
different kind of motion, or something else altogether. I will investigate what this 
confusion may belie in section VII, but for now I will simply examine each possibility 
separately. I believe Currie ultimately wants to, and ultimately must argue that film 
images display garden-variety motion, and I will look at that claim in the next section. 
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But first I would like to look closely at the strongest argument against film images’ 
having the special response-dependent motion Currie sometimes claims for them. This is 
the argument in which Currie considers the Müller-Lyer illusion. 
One of the lines in the above figure looks longer than the other. If you have not 
seen the image before, you may believe that the bottom line is longer than the top one. If 
you have, you probably know that they are both the same length. However, even if you 
do know this, you cannot help the bottoms line’s seeming longer. In this case you are 
undergoing a perceptual illusion. 
Now, the danger Currie sees in the Müller-Lyer illusion is that his claim that there 
is a special kind of response-dependent motion that cinematic images really undergo (as 
opposed to an illusion of garden-variety motion) will lead to the elimination of any sort 
of illusion. For could we not equally say that there is a special kind of response-
dependent length, which we see the lower line really has more of than the upper? If that 
were true, it would turn out that the Müller-Lyer illusion is not an illusion after all, but 
evidence for a new property: response-dependent length. 
Currie wants to avoid this conclusion, but it is not clear that he can. His first 
response is that our experience of the Müller-Lyer figure does not involve a judgement 
about some weird response-dependent property, but simply one about length. The lower 
line seems longer – it seems to have more garden-variety length. But the obvious 
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response to this is that in the theatre one seems to see garden-variety motion, not some 
related response-dependent effect. 
Currie’s rejoinder to this is that in fact our intuitions diverge in the Müller-Lyer 
and cinematic cases. He says 
the visible appearance of the lines suggests that, were you to measure them in the 
conventional way, the result would be that one was measurably longer than the other. 
That is why this is genuinely a case of an illusion, rather than a veridical experience of a 
response-dependent property. With the experience of screen watching, however, it is 
doubtful whether the movement that our experience represents as taking place is of a 
kind that would be undermined by independent checks analogous to the measuring 
check we carry out in the case of the Muller-Lyer [sic] illusion.14 
But it seems to me that almost everyone is happy to say that the film’s claim to real 
motion is undermined by “independent checks analogous to the measuring check” – like 
the slowing down of the projector to the point where one perceives a succession of still 
images. 
A supporter of Currie might voice doubts about whether the slowed-down 
projector really is an independent check analogous to the measuring check on the Müller-
Lyer illusion.15 One of his concerns could be that when one slows down the projector, 
one has changed the conditions of perception, and these might be integral to the nature of 
what is under investigation. Suppose we cover the arrowheads of the Müller-Lyer figure 
with sheets of white paper. If we then announce that since everyone now sees the lines as 
being the same length, we have shown that the figure is no illusion at all, no one will be 
too impressed with our claims. But this too is disanalogous with the heuristic of the 
slowed-down projector. 
The point of slowing down the projector is to show people what is going on when 
it is run at normal speed, since there are aspects of the process that become invisible at 
that speed. The point is not that when you slow down the projector the (apparent) motion 
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ceases to occur, so it must be an illusion. The point is that once you have understood 
what is going on at the lower level of the mechanics of projection (and on the assumption 
that this is something different from what you thought was going on) you will change 
your mind about what to say at the higher level of perception of the normally projected 
film. 
Hence another analogy, attractive to a Curriean as a reductio of my position, loses 
traction. It could be argued that if one slowed down the molecular processes which 
enable, or perhaps even constitute, the life of an organism, to the point where the 
organism ceased to be alive, one would not have shown that life is an illusion. This is true 
enough. But to be analogous to the slowed-down projector heuristic, the evil biochemist 
would have to show you something at the molecular level which you were missing when 
life was happening at normal speed such that you would change your tune about whether 
life is real, as opposed to illusory, when everything is running normally. It is not clear 
what he could hope to show you, whereas the discrete nature of cinematic projection is 
usually enough to convince people of (or rather explain to them) the illusion of cinematic 
motion. 
At this point an anti-illusionist might refer to an actual case from the history of 
science. We used to, and as folk probably still do, have a conception of solidity as a kind 
of thoroughgoing homogeneity. But when our technology developed to the point where 
we could look very closely at tables, bars of gold, and so on, we discovered that 
thoroughgoing homogeneity is not in fact instantiated anywhere. But we did not then 
conclude that tables were not solid. Analogously, it is not clear that we should deny 
  Andrew Kania 
 11 
motion to cinematic images just because we know that their underlying bases do not 
exactly move. 
This is a bad analogy because in the case of solidity we examined paradigm 
possessors of the property. It turned out nothing was solid in the way we thought things 
were, so we had two options. We could abandon talk of solidity, claiming we were 
mistaken when we predicated it of tables and bars of gold. However, if we had taken this 
route we would have had to invent some new term for the property we thought consisted 
in thoroughgoing homogeneity, for it is a very useful property to talk about. The other 
option is the one we in fact chose. We realized that solidity played an important role in 
our theories, and that we were mistaken not about the distinctness of things we called 
solid from things we called liquid and gaseous, but only about the underlying basis of that 
distinguishing property. So we simply concluded that solidity consists in something other 
than the thoroughgoing homogeneity we had previously assumed. 
Now the putative motion of cinematic images is under debate precisely because it 
seems a very different kind of thing from the motion of bicycles, balls, and so on. If it 
turned out that they moved by virtue of being stationary in twenty-four slightly different 
positions at twenty-four separate periods of time per second we might say that motion 
consists in something other than what we previously believed, and that cinematic images 
move paradigmatically. But that is not Currie’s claim. Currie takes garden-variety motion 
to consist in just what we think it consists in.16 This allows him to consider whether 
cinematic images move in a different way (which claim I have investigated in this 
section) or in the ordinary way (which I address in the next). 
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So, if Currie wants to claim that cinematic motion is (an instance of) a special 
kind of motion, the Müller-Lyer objection is a strong one. The introduction of this new 
kind of motion takes the normal film experience out of the realm of the illusory, where 
everyone seems to agree it belongs, and into the realm of the real. But the price one must 
pay for this is the certification of many other things as real which are currently 
considered illusory. And this starts to look very much like the more liberal attitude 
towards reality which Currie was at pains to avoid. 
 IV 
Let us see, then, if film images exhibit garden-variety motion. Currie quickly passes over 
an important point about garden-variety motion relevant to the putative motion of film 
images, but again he seems to get it wrong. The point is that during a period of normal 
motion, an object passes through every point on some path between any two locations 
occupied by it. More particularly, an object does not normally move by its being in one 
place at one point in time, and then being in another non-contiguous place at another non-
contiguous point in time without having passed through all the intervening contiguous 
places, while existing at every contiguous moment in the intervening time. Currie nods 
towards this when he says 
we see that [an image] is in one place on the screen, and we later see that it is in 
another; indeed, we see – really see – that image move from one place to another on the 
screen.…It is an image sustained by the continuous impact of light on the surface of the 
screen.17 
But here, surely, Currie has made a simple factual error. There is not continuous 
light upon the screen when a film is shown. There are twenty-four impacts of light on the 
screen every second, each one separated from its predecessor and successor by a short 
period of darkness.18 
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Now, like many metaphysicians, I would be rather reluctant to admit items into 
my ontology which went in and out of existence, even if, like Currie’s images, they 
normally did so so fast I would not notice them. But even if one did allow them into 
one’s ontology, one would surely not immediately allow that if they disappeared in one 
place and reappeared in another they were simply moving from the one place to the other. 
That would certainly be a brave new type of motion which we would hope we could say 
something more about (and would probably want to give its own unique name). Yet again 
we can see that film’s frame-by-frame nature forces us to deny that its images really 
move, in any standard sense. 
Of course, if we imagine a case where many of Currie’s presuppositions actually 
hold, we can imagine a kind of film wherein the images really do move. Suppose we had 
some kind of technology such that a projector shone a beam of light continuously through 
a single cell – like a single film frame. And suppose that the constitution of the frame 
would change over time – perhaps it would be a kind of transparent, colored liquid crystal 
display controlled by a computer program. Then the images on the screen would mirror 
the movements within the liquid crystal cell. They would be continuously and 
contiguously moving.19 In this case I would be much happier ascribing movement to 
images on screen. 
Now, a Curriean might point out that once this technology existed, we could 
convert old films to the new medium, and thus, according to me, in the LCD re-release of 
The Searchers the image of John Wayne really would move across the screen. But to a 
viewer in the theatre, the experience of watching the film and that of watching the LCD 
re-release, we may presume, would be indistinguishable. Yet I seem to have to claim that 
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in the film the images are not moving, while in the LCD projection they are. However, I 
am happy to say this. Just as you can set up what looks like a Müller-Lyer illusion, but in 
which the line that looks longer actually is longer, you can have illusions of movement, 
and things you might assume to be illusions of movement but which are in fact true 
movements. 
 V 
The arguments I have considered above are concerned with showing that the movement 
of images is real rather than illusory by investigating the property of movement. But 
another strand in Currie’s arguments worth teasing apart is concerned with the nature of 
the object which is moving – the image. Again he contrasts what he claims is real motion 
– that of images – with illusions (the Müller-Lyer illusion and the illusory movement of a 
wave). I will not talk much more about the Müller-Lyer illusion, but it is worth quoting 
Currie on the ontological distinction he thinks makes the difference. 
I do not think that our experience of screen watching is an experience which has as its 
representational content: There are reidentifiable physical objects moving in front of 
our eyes. Rather, its content is: There are images of reidentifiable physical objects 
moving in front of our eyes. In this respect the experience seems not to be undercut by 
information from other sources, and therefore to be crucially different from that induced 
by the Muller-Lyer [sic] setup.20 
He makes a similar distinction when contrasting wave motion with image motion. 
In the case of the wave, but not in the case of the cinematic image, there is a physical 
object, namely a body of water, which perception represents to us as moving outward as 
the wave ‘spreads’. But our perception of the motion of cinematic images does not 
suggest that there is some particular physical object which moves when a cinematic 
image does.21 
Now, it seems clear to me that Currie is correct in his claim that we in no sense 
perceive there to be physical objects moving up on the screen, or on the other side of its 
‘window’. But he is invoking a false dichotomy if his claim is that since we do not have 
an illusion of physical objects moving in front of us, we must have a veridical experience 
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of images moving in front of us. An obvious third possibility is that we have an illusion 
of images moving in front of us. 
Take what Currie claims to be part of the content of our cinematic experience: 
‘There are images of reidentifiable physical objects moving in front of our eyes’.22 Now 
out of context this is ambiguous, in that it could mean that we have impressions of 
physical objects moving in front of us, while this is precisely the content he is contrasting 
it with. He is, rather, claiming that it is the images which move, not the objects of which 
they are images. However, he does make it explicit that these objects are physical and 
reidentifiable. This might seem crucial to his argument. For motion, after all, is 
continuous change of spatial location over time. So it is important when identifying 
instances of motion that one can reidentify the object putatively moving. If you think you 
see a tomato in the dining room that you just left in the kitchen, you check to make sure it 
is the same tomato. If it is a different one, there is no motion to be explained. 
But now we are clearly focusing on the wrong object again. What is under dispute 
is not that Jeff Bridges is moving in front of our eyes when we watch The Big Lebowski. 
That is plainly false. But neither is it disputed that we can see from watching The Big 
Lebowski that Jeff Bridges really did move as part of the creation of The Big Lebowski. 
And Jeff Bridges, in this case, is one of the reidentifiable physical objects Currie is 
talking about. 
The physicality of the object the image is an image of is also a red herring, as 
Currie points out later in the article. He rightly wants to allow that cartoon film images 
move in exactly the same way photographic film images do. What we want to see, then, 
is not whether these putatively moving images are of reidentifiable physical objects, but 
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whether the images themselves are reidentifiable objects. If we can answer this question 
positively, then we can ask whether these reidentifiable objects are moving. 
Currie seems to stress that we do not get the impression (nor is it true) that film 
images are physical objects. I agree with this claim, but again, I do not think it gets Currie 
anywhere. He says that our impression that a wave is moving outward from its source is 
illusory because we seem to see a reidentifiable physical object (part of a body of water) 
moving, but in fact there is no such physical object. Then he claims that since we do not 
have the impression of a reidentifiable physical object moving when we watch a film, 
that motion is not illusory. But again, he has not shown enough. He must show that the 
motion of the (non-physical) image is that of a single reidentifiable (non-physical) thing, 
and not an illusion brought about by some other means. 
So let us look at the reidentifiability of film images. Imagine Paul the 
Projectionist showing Vince the Viewer a five-second medium-length shot from a fixed 
camera of a character played by John Wayne walking across the desert. Wayne is wholly 
within the frame throughout. 
(Paul runs the film for Vince) 
PAUL:  So, what did you think? 
VINCE: Great! I love seeing John Wayne striding manfully up there, right in front of me. 
PAUL: Well, strictly speaking John Wayne himself wasn’t up there in front of you, right? 
VINCE: Well, no, obviously I only saw an image of John Wayne walking in front of me. 
PAUL: An image walking? I didn’t think they were the sorts of things that had legs. 
VINCE: You’ve been taking too many philosophy courses, mate. I didn’t mean I saw an 
image-of-John-Wayne walking. I saw an image of John-Wayne-walking. 
PAUL: Oh, right, like a photo of John Wayne walking. 
VINCE: Well, yes. But the great thing about film is that the image actually moves. It 
doesn’t walk, of course, but it can be an image of someone walking by being an 
image which moves in such and such a way. 
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PAUL: So you’re saying the image of John Wayne – the picture, if you like – moved 
from one side of the screen to the other. 
VINCE: Precisely. 
PAUL: OK, so this image here (he starts the projector running again, and points to John 
Wayne on the right of the screen) is the same as this image here (pointing to John 
Wayne, now on the left of the screen). 
VINCE: Yeah. Didn’t you see it move? 
PAUL: But, listen. You’re saying that this image here (he projects a single frame from the 
first second of footage) is the same image as this image here (a single frame from 
the last second of footage). But that can’t be right. In the first image you can only 
see his left eye. In the second, he’s facing the camera – you can see both. 
VINCE: Well, OK, they’re not the same image. But when you run them all in the proper 
way, like a normal projectionist would, the individual frames or images seem to 
disappear. You have the impression of a single moving image. 
PAUL: I agree with you there, Vince. As long as under pressure you’re happy to say that 
the motion’s an impression, or an illusion. 
This, I think, is ultimately what we must say with regard to the apparent motion of 
film images. It is indeed apparent – an illusion brought about by the speedy succession of 
similar still images. There is no single reidentifiable image which is moving.  
 VI 
A supporter of Currie might suggest that the motion of film images can be understood by 
analogy with the motion of shadows. When I walk along the sunny side of the street, my 
shadow keeps pace perfectly with me; it seems to move as surely as I do. Similarly, when 
the sun moves across the sky, the shadows of buildings move over the ground. This 
shows, argues the Curriean, that shadows are higher-order entities than the momentary 
patterns of light and dark which constitute them, just as dogs and statues are higher-order 
entities than the collections of cells and lumps of clay that respectively constitute them.23 
I would like to talk about all three aspects of this analysis: the distinction between 
persisting shadows and the momentary patterns of light and dark which make them up, 
the motion of the higher-order shadows, and the analogy with film images. Firstly, I think 
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the distinction between persisting shadows and their constituent patterns is a helpful one. 
Jerrold Levinson has suggested to me that under pressure of arguments like that of the 
slowed-down projector, anti-illusionists may do well to draw a similar distinction 
between image-slices (roughly identical with frames) and the cinematic images they 
constitute (the ones we see moving at the cinema). But it seems to me the two cases are 
disanalogous precisely where we begin to talk about movement. 
Let us look at three things putatively moving – a coffee cup I wave before your 
eyes, my shadow as I walk along the street, and a cinematic image of a ball rolling along 
the ground. The first is a paradigmatic example of motion. Now, I take it that part of its 
being paradigmatic rests on the fact that at any moment the cup is at a certain spatial 
location, and that at the moments just before and after it is at contiguous locations.24 
The shadow is a slightly trickier case, precisely because we are not so 
immediately certain there is a persisting object here. But when we think of its putative 
movement, we realize that, just as in the coffee-cup case, at any moment the shadow is in 
a particular spatial location (or, in order not to beg the question, that there is at least a 
pattern of light and dark produced by the same light-source and object) and that at the 
preceding and following moments the shadow is at spatially contiguous locations 
(or,…mutatis mutandis). And it seems that this is enough to start a case for a single 
entity’s persisting, rather than the illusion of such. 
Note that the identity of the shadow becomes uncertain again when we alter the 
conditions. The same source of light and object together do not appear to be sufficient for 
the identity of a shadow. For instance, my shadow on the meadow where I do Tai Chi 
today is not the same shadow as the one I cast there yesterday.25 It is not clear to me that 
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the shadow I cast before I walk behind a building that occludes it is the same as that 
which ‘reappears’ when I emerge from behind the building. Nor is it clear that I am 
casting one and the same shadow as I dance for a few minutes under a stroboscopic light, 
even if in all these cases I am talking of the higher-order shadows, capable of movement. 
And the uncertainty comes about precisely because there are stretches of time when it is 
not clear that this higher-order entity is in existence at all, and hence that that necessary 
feature of paradigmatic motion – contiguous spatial locations of a single object at 
contiguous moments – is absent. 
At this stage, the anti-illusionist may respond that these problematic shadows are 
beside the point in a discussion of cinematic motion, for here we have images 
continuously moving. Just as in the case of the paradigmatic moving shadow, or indeed 
the dog or statue, we have a higher-order entity. But merely stating that there is a higher-
order entity – the cinematic (moving) image, as opposed to its constituent image slices, 
say – is not enough. We need an argument for its existence. Now it seems to me this 
argument could take one of two forms. One is an analogy with the moving shadow: it is 
not clear whether the proposed entity exists, but there seems to be motion, because the 
paradigmatic condition of motion is fulfilled (witness the contiguous spatio-temporal 
locations of the lower-order entities). This argument will not hold, because of what 
becomes clear with the slowed-down projector. There is not spatio-temporal contiguity 
here, so the anti-illusionist will need some other argument for the existence of the higher-
order cinematic image. 
The second argument is simply that we see the higher-order entity. Unlike the 
cases of problematic shadows, we can continuously point to the moving image on screen; 
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it does not appear to go in and out of existence. But this argument falls to the same 
objections Currie raises to the proposal of response-dependent length as a property of the 
Müller-Lyer illusion. If we are to grant existence to things merely on the basis of their 
seeming real, we will be at a loss to find any illusions in the world. And as surely as there 
is a real world out there, there are illusions too. 
There are two thought-experiments an anti-illusionist might use to push the weak 
illusionist’s intuitions about film images in the direction of our shared intuitions about 
shadows. The first asks what we would say if we discovered that light is necessarily 
stroboscopic. We find out that the sun, lasers, ordinary light bulbs, and so on, all actually 
flash on and off extremely quickly, despite their appearance of continuously shining. 
Surely if this turned out to be the case, the Curriean asks, we would still say that 
paradigmatic shadows move?26 
I am not sure I would say that. For, as we noted above, paradigmatic shadows are 
not paradigms of movement. If something very different is going on when shadows 
appear to move from when bicycles and balls do, I suspect that we would want to 
predicate different things of them. Moreover if we are to preserve the term ‘motion’ for 
only one of these types, I suspect we would use it for the current paradigms – bicycles 
and balls. And if we are this reluctant to ascribe motion to higher-order entities 
supervenient on patterns of stroboscopic light, how much more so we must be with film 
images. They not only flicker on and off along with the projection beam, but are 
constituted out of series of these flickerings separated by longer periods of darkness. 
The second thought-experiment nudges one’s intuitions from the other side. The 
Curriean asks us to imagine a continuum of possible projectors with capacities to show an 
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increasing number of frames per second.27 As the limit of frames per second approaches 
infinity, would we not ascribe real motion to the resulting images? 
Again, I do not think I would, for the number of frames per second is irrelevant to 
the necessary condition of paradigmatic movement. A very fast projector still produces a 
succession of still images, not a single contiguously moving image. If pressed on to 
consideration of a projector capable of an infinite number of frames per second, I am not 
sure what to say. But my concession of that point would not get the anti-illusionist very 
far. 
VII 
There is a final possibility which I will touch on, but a full consideration of which would 
take me too far afield. What prompted me to consider this possibility was Currie’s 
vacillation about whether the image’s motion is supposed to be real or response-
dependent. In many places he seems to claim that it is the canonical kind of motion that 
he is invoking. Firstly, he often has recourse to such phrases as “we literally see 
movement on the screen,”28 “there really is movement within a single shot taken from a 
fixed perspective,”29 and “Film is moving picture. Literally, that is.”30 Secondly, he has 
already rejected taking a more liberal approach to what we can claim as real.31 Thirdly, 
his claim would simply not be so interesting if it were just that in films we see motion2, a 
different kind of thing from motion1 (that is, what bikes, people, and shadows have), 
because if we are under an illusion of motion when we watch a film, it is surely an 
illusion of garden-variety motion, not some weird kind of motion unheard of till now. 
On the other hand, there is evidence that Currie thinks cinematic motion is a very 
different kind of property. The clearest evidence, along with his consideration of the 
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Müller-Lyer illusion, is his concluding remarks to both “Film, Reality, and Illusion” and 
the first chapter of Image and Mind. In both places he says that his conclusions 
go beyond film theory to embrace general metaphysics. It is traditional to regard motion 
as a paradigmatically primary quality, to be contrasted with those secondary qualities 
which are in some sense observer-dependent, like color. If what I have said here about 
cinematic motion is correct, we shall have to acknowledge a kind of motion which takes 
its place among the secondary qualities.32 
Here he clearly talks of a different kind of motion from the “paradigmatically primary 
quality” we are all familiar with. But this is obviously at odds with his bold assertions 
that film images simply, literally move. 
Now, I think this confusion may be a sign of the intuition that the image itself – 
the object – is somehow response-dependent. This would leave open the possibility that 
its motion – the property predicated of the object – is garden-variety. The notion of a 
response-dependent object is fairly unclear to me (though after-images may be 
paradigmatic examples). I am not sure, for instance, whether the properties of a response-
dependent object would necessarily be response-dependent themselves, or whether they 
could be garden-variety. A suggestion of Jerrold Levinson’s that film images may be sui 
generis entities with their own type of space and motion (though shared with flip-books, I 
suppose) may arise out of a similar intuition. 
However, much more would have to be said about images as response-dependent 
objects than Currie even hints at, before this became a respectable position. I will leave 
that work to someone else. It seems clear to me that we need not, and should not, 
postulate such strange entities when we can explain the motion of cinematic images in 
such a simple way: it is an illusion.33 
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